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Chapter 13 
 
 
Tax Credits 
 
 
Jane Millar 
 
 
Summary 
 
Until fairly recently, paid employment and social security benefits have usually been 
seen as alternative sources of income. Wages were assumed to meet needs in work, 
with a small state contribution to the costs of children. Benefits replaced earnings for 
those periods when people were unable to support themselves through employment. 
But, as low-paid work has expanded, for some people wages alone may not be 
sufficient to provide a household with an adequate living standard, or an individual 
with sufficient financial incentive to take up paid work.  
 
Thus employed people have been gradually brought into the social security system, at 
first through an in-work benefit for low-paid families with children, and now through 
a system of tax credits. This chapter: 
 
• traces the development of in-work benefits and tax credits in the UK since the 
1970s; 
• outlines the policy goals and describes the main features of the tax credit system 
introduced in 2003; 
• assesses tax credits against policy objectives; 
• sets out the problems that have arisen in the administration of tax credits; and  
• discusses the role of tax credits in welfare reform.    
 
 
The start of in-work benefits in the UK: family income supplement 
 
Beveridge’s plan for social security set out a scheme with three main elements. These 
were: national insurance benefits (funded by contributions from workers, employers 
and the government; intended as a replacement for earnings loss); national assistance 
benefits (funded from general taxation, means-tested support for people with low 
incomes); and family allowances (funded from general taxation, paid at the same rate 
for all families, regardless of income level). Thus, with the partial exception of family 
allowances, the main function of social security benefits was clearly to replace lost 
earnings, not to pay benefits to working people.  
 
This wage replacement system operated successfully in the 1950s and into the 1960s, 
a period characterised by full employment and stable families (see Chapter 8 here, 
Rowlingson).  Poverty studies at the time suggested that working poverty had been 
largely eliminated. However, by the mid-1960s the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ 
challenged this benign view of welfare state success. In their influential study, Abel-
Smith and Townsend (1965) found that poverty was much more widespread than had 
been thought, and also that it was increasingly a problem for working families, with 
one in five poor families with children being working families.  
 
Thus by the early 1970s, the gaps and shortfalls of the Beveridge scheme were 
becoming much more visible and filling some of these gaps became an important part 
of the policy agenda. The new measures introduced for non-working people in the 
early to mid 1970s included non-contributory pensions, the extension of widow’s 
benefits, and various benefits for disabled people. In relation to poor working 
families, various alternatives were being debated and considered. One option would 
have been for stronger measures of wage protection and regulation, including a 
national minimum wage. But this was not supported either by the governments of the 
time or by the trade unions, which were committed to free collective bargaining over 
wages (Brown, 1983; Millar et al, 1997).  There was also a proposal was for a ‘tax 
credit’ scheme, set out by the government (Cmnd 4653, 1971) which would have 
replaced personal tax allowances (which exempt a portion of gross income from tax 
and so reduce payments to the tax system) with a refundable tax credit (which can 
reduce tax owed to below zero and so lead to a payment from the tax system). This 
would have meant that people with earnings below the tax threshold would have 
received additional cash support. This proposal almost reached the legislative stage 
before being rejected as too costly. 
 
Thus, in the early1970s, neither wage regulation nor tax reform was seen as able to 
provide a solution to the problem of poverty among working families. That left the 
social security system, and the key measure here was the introduction of family 
income supplement in 1971. This new means-tested benefit was payable to families 
with dependent children, with an employed parent working at least 30 hours per week, 
and with wages below a certain level. It was originally introduced as a temporary 
measure, while the government considered the future of family support more 
generally (Deacon and Bradshaw, 1983).  In the event, although child benefit was 
introduced in 1975 to replace family allowances and child tax allowances, family 
income supplement continued alongside these. Initially, as table 13.1 shows, this was 
a rather small and insignificant benefit, it did not cost very much and not many 
families received it. Take-up rates (the proportion of those eligible who actually 
received it) started at about 35 per cent in 1971 and had only reached about 50 percent 
by 1979 (Brown, 1983).  
 
Table 13.1 Family Income Supplement, 1971 to 1979 
Year Numbers in 
receipt 
Costs (£m)  
Cash 
Costs (£m) in 
2008/9 real terms 
1971/72 71,000 4 39 
1972/73       106,000 10 95 
1974/75 67,000 12 89 
1976/77 97,000 18 93 
1978/79 88,000 24 101 
Source: Millar et al (1997, table1); DWP (2008) Benefit Expenditure Tables, Table 
3a: nominal terms and Table 4a: real terms, 2008/09 prices, 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd4/medium_term.asp
  
The 1986 Social Security Act was an important piece of legislation in this story and 
one that really established wage supplementation through means-tested benefits as a 
legitimate, and integral, function of the social security system.  Income support was 
introduced to replace supplementary benefit, and family credit was introduced to 
replace family income supplement. Common means tests were established for both, 
and for housing benefit, so that benefits in and out of work were more closely aligned. 
Family Credit was very much intended to act as a work incentive, as the key 
objectives show:   
‘to provide extra support to these families in accordance with their needs; 
to ensure that as far as possible they are better off in work; and  to see that 
they can achieve improvements in family income by greater effort without 
losing all benefit’ (DHSS, 1985, p29).  
 
The structure and eligibility conditions for family credit were much the same as for 
family income supplement, although it was a more generous system.  It was available 
for families with children, with earnings below a certain level according to family 
size, and there was a weekly hours threshold (a minimum of 24 hours per week).  
Eligibility was assessed with reference to family income over a 5-week (or 2 month) 
period, and once awarded the amount paid was fixed for the next six months. It was 
paid to the main carer, as either by an order book (cashable at post offices) or directly 
into back accounts. This was not what the government originally proposed, which was 
that it should be paid through the wage packet, and therefore to the wage earner rather 
than to the main carer. This transfer from ‘wallet to purse’ was strongly resisted, by 
women’s groups (including Conservative women) and by employers, who were not 
very willing to take on the responsibility of administering this.  
 
Various rule changes increased the scope of the benefit over the next ten years, 
including a reduction in the qualifying hours threshold from 24 to 16 in April 1992, 
and the introduction of disregards for maintenance and childcare costs. Family credit 
receipt started relatively slowly but then started to rise rapidly, as table 13.2 shows. 
The number of recipients more than doubled between 1989 and 1996, from almost 
300,000 to almost 700,000.  Family credit was available to lone parents on the same 
basis as it was to couples, and many employed lone parents were (and are) in low-paid 
work, and so lone parents made up a significant proportion of those in receipt. Take-
up also improved, with DSS estimating take-up rates in the mid 1990s of about 70 per 
cent by caseload and 82 per cent by expenditure (DSS, 1996). Research on non-take-
up concluded that many of these non-claiming families were probably only eligible 
for short periods and for relatively small amounts of money (McKay and Marsh, 
1995). The Conservative government regarded family credit as one of its great 
successes, and introduced a similar in-work benefit (the disability working allowance) 
for disabled people in 1992. It also piloted a similar ‘Earnings Top-Up’ for single 
people and couples without dependent children (Finlayson et al, 2000).  
 
Table 13.2 Family Credit, 1988 to 1996 
Year Total 
numbers 
in receipt 
Couples  Lone 
parents 
Costs (£m) 
cash 
Costs (£m) 
in 2008/9 
real terms 
1988/89 285,000 177,000 108,000 394 754 
1989/90 299,000 180,000 119,000 425 759 
1991/92 350,000 213,000 136,000 626 977 
1993/94 520,000 293,000 228,000 1208 1779 
1995/96 693,000 388,000 305,000 1740 2449 
Source: Millar et al (1997); DWP, Benefit Expenditure Tables, Tables 3 and 3a : 
nominal terms and Table 4 and 4a: real terms, 2008/09 prices, 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd4/medium_term.asp
 
 
‘Making work pay’: Working Families Tax Credit  
 
By the time the Labour government won the 1997 election the principle of 
supplementing wages through the social security system was thus well established. In 
the welfare reform Green Paper, New ambitions for our country: a new contract for 
welfare (Cm 3805, 1998, p1) the government argued that ‘paid work is the surest 
route out of poverty’ but that ‘people face a series of barriers to paid work, including 
financial disincentives’. This started the development of a series of reforms to 
employment services and benefits (see chapters 11, Wright and 15 Stafford here). 
Measures to improve financial incentives to work included the introduction (for the 
first time in the UK) of a National Minimum Wage, reductions in tax and national 
insurance contributions for low-paid workers, and the introduction of Working 
Families Tax Credit and Disabled Person’s Tax Credit.   
 It was the Treasury in particular that was driving these measures through, and the tax 
credits story can be traced through a series of Treasury papers called The 
Modernisation of Britain’s Tax and Benefit System (HM Treasury 1997, 1998a, 
1998b, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008). The second of these, the report on ‘work 
incentives’ by Martin Taylor, is a key document in this story (HM Treasury, 1998a). 
Martin Taylor, Chief Executive of Barclays, was asked to chair a task force set up in 
May 1997 (immediately after the election) with a remit to ‘examine the interaction of 
the tax and benefits systems so that they can be streamlined and modernised, so as to 
fulfil our objectives of promoting work incentives, reducing poverty and welfare 
dependency, and strengthening community and family life’ (HMT, 1998a, p 5)1. 
Taylor starts by rejecting a full-scale integration of the tax and benefits systems on the 
grounds that they have different objectives, do not cover the same people, and have 
different units of assessment (individual for taxes, family for benefits). He argues that 
in-work wage supplements are necessary because there are ‘a large number of people 
whose labour is not sufficiently well rewarded to allow them to support their families 
in an acceptable way. It seems to me far better that these people should be working, 
and receiving in-work benefits to top up their net pay, than that they should be idle’ (p 
8) and he argues for a tax credit, as opposed to a benefit because: 
 
A tax credit will associate the payment in the recipient’s mind with the 
fact of working, a potentially valuable psychological change. I believe 
that a payment through the tax system, associated with the recipients 
work, is likely to prove more acceptable to society at large. And the 
establishment of a tax credit system is likely to come in useful in 
future as a broader delivery mechanism, eventually allowing closer 
integration between the benefits system and conventional income tax’ 
(op cit, p8). 
 
These points were repeated in the next Treasury paper (HMT, 1998b), which set out 
the details of the new tax credits:  
                                                 
1 The report covered national insurance contributions and benefits for the partners of unemployed 
claimants as well as tax credits, but we focus on the latter here.   
  ‘As a tax credit rather than a welfare benefit, it will reduce the stigma 
associated with claiming in-work support, and encourage higher take-
up. Its clear link with employment should demonstrate the rewards of 
work over welfare and help ensure that people move off welfare into 
work’ (op cit, p3). 
 
The key rationale for a tax credit, as opposed to a benefit, is thus that taxes are 
positively associated with paid work while benefits are negatively associated with 
dependency. This, it is argued, makes tax credits more acceptable to recipients and to 
the public in general. The language here is also notable, it clearly reflects the 
influence of the USA, where ‘welfare’ is a negative term associated with dependency 
and failure (Deacon, 2000; Hirsch, 2000, see also Chapter 11 here, Wright).  Indeed, 
there has been much policy sharing and policy transfer across countries in respect of 
tax credit provisions, with the USA experience, and values, an important element in 
this. Box 13.1 outlines the system in the USA and gives some further examples of tax 
credits in other countries.  
 
Box 13.1 Tax Credits in the USA, Australia and Canada 
The USA 
The 'Earned Income Tax Credit' (EITC) has been in operation in the US as a federal 
scheme since the mid 1970s, but it is only in the past ten years or so that it has come 
to play a central role as part of the drive to 'end welfare' and get people into paid 
work. It is now a very large programme costing about $34 billion in 2003 and 
received by about 19 million families. The EITC is mainly targeted at families with 
children although it also available, at lower levels of payment, to childless and to 
single people. It is a refundable credit, which initially rises as earnings rise, then is 
paid at a maximum rate over a wide range of income, and finally is reduced as 
earnings increase until it reaches zero. Most families opt to receive their EITC 
annually, as a lump sum at the end of the year, rather than as an ongoing payment. 
Holt (2006) provides an overview of thirty years of the EITC and concludes that it is 
‘has become a robust and largely successful component of American labor and 
antipoverty policy’ (page 1). 
 Australia 
There are two main benefits for children delivered through the tax system in 
Australia: Family Tax Benefit Part A is a means-tested payment similar to the UK’s 
Child Tax Credit. Family Tax Benefit Part B provides extra assistance to single-
income families including lone parents, with higher rates for families with children 
under five years of age. Around 2.2 million families with 4.3 million children receive 
Family Tax Benefits, covering about 80 per cent of families. As in the UK, there is an 
assessment based on annual income with an end of year reconciliation. And, also as in 
the UK, the issue of overpayments have given cause for concern and various reforms 
form 2006 have sought to reduce these. See the Australian National Audit Office 
(2006).  
 
Canada The Child Tax Credit is available to lower income families with children, 
paid monthly, on the basis of annual earnings but with no annual reconciliation. It is 
therefore very simple in design but set at a relatively low level. There is ongoing 
debate about the merits of setting up a wider tax credit system to support low-paid 
workers, see Battle and Mendelson (2005).  
 
See Whiteford et al (2003) for a comparison of how Australia, Canada and the UK 
have designed their tax credits systems. 
 
 
However, despite the presentation of these tax credits as something new and different, 
their structure was in fact very similar to that of family credit.  As with Family Credit, 
Working Families Tax Credit was available only for families with children, it was 
paid to those with earnings below a certain level according to family size, and there 
was still a weekly hours threshold of 16 hours per week. Once awarded WFTC 
remained in payment for six months, regardless of changes in income or 
circumstances. All this mirrored the family credit rules, albeit more generously. 
Working Families Tax Credit also included a ‘childcare tax credit’ which covered up 
to 70 per cent of eligible costs for registered care, subject to a maximum limit. This 
was available to lone parents and couples if both parents were in paid work.  
 Table 13.3 shows the numbers in receipt of Working Families Tax Credit from 1999 
to 2002 (it was replaced in 2003). In November 1999 there were about 966,000 
families in receipt. Lone parents outnumbered couples (as they had done since about 
November 1998 for Family Credit) and the average payment was about £66 per week. 
The numbers in receipt rose steadily every year, reaching 1.3 million families in May 
2002 with an average weekly payment of about £88.  About 162,000 families were 
receiving help with childcare costs. 
 
Table 13.3 Working Families Tax Credit, 1999 to 2002 
          
Year Number in 
receipt (000s)
Couples 
(000s) 
Lone parents 
(000s) 
Average 
weekly 
amount 
Childcare tax 
credit (000s) 
1999 9,66 468 498 £66 55 
2000 1,061 513 548 £73 108 
2001 1,259 617 642 £84 145 
2002 1,340 634 706 £88 162 
In May of each year, except 1999 November 
Source:  Inland Revenue (2002) 
 
The Treasury was, perhaps not surprisingly, very upbeat in their assessment of 
Working Families Tax Credit (HMT, 2000, pp 9-10). It had, they argued, tackled the 
unemployment trap by ensuring that families were ‘generally’ better off in work and 
tackled the poverty trap by reducing by two-thirds the number of families with 
marginal tax rates of over 70 per cent. Alongside other measures it had also helped to 
increase the number of people seeking to enter work by about 160,000 and it had 
helped to increase family incomes, especially for the poorest families and so 
contributed to reduced levels of child poverty.  
 
Independent research partly confirmed some of this, but also showed a more complex 
picture (Brewer and Gregg, 2001; Blundell and Walker, 2001; McLaughlin et al, 
2001). The financial gains to work were indeed generally higher, but this applied 
primarily to full-time work and was much less the case for those receiving housing 
benefit (which is reduced as Working Families Tax Credit is received) and for those 
with high work costs including childcare costs (which were only partly met by the 
childcare care tax credit).  Families in receipt of other means-tested benefits (again 
particularly housing benefit) still faced high marginal tax rates. The labour supply 
effect was estimated to be positive for lone parents and for the first earner in a couple. 
But the incentive for a second earner in a couple to take up work was much reduced2.  
 
Tax credits from 2003: Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit 
 
The Working Families and Disabled Person’s Tax Credits were replaced in 2003 by 
the ‘next generation’ of tax credits.  
 
The Child Tax Credit is available to families with dependent children and consists of 
three elements: the family element which is the basic payment per family, the child 
element which is the amount per child, and a disabled child element for families 
caring for a disabled child. It has a wide coverage, with about nine in ten families 
eligible for the family element (see further discussion below).   
 
The Working Tax Credit is targeted on low-paid workers, including families with 
children or disabled people if they work at least 16 hours per week, and single people 
and couples without children if they are aged 25 and above and work for at least 30 
hours per week. It includes a thirty hour element for those with children (i.e. an extra 
payment for hours of work of 30 and above) and elements for disabled workers and 
people aged over 50.  
 
The Working Tax Credit also includes a childcare tax credit for lone parents and 
couples where both are employed for at least 16 hours per week. This pays up to 80 
per cent up to a maximum of £175 for one child and £300 for two children or more 
(rates in 2008). It is only payable to families using registered childcare. 
                                                 
2 This disincentive to second earner also existed under family credit of course, although less strongly 
because the level of benefit was lower. This problem is inherent in a family-based means test - when 
the second earner enters work the amount of benefit received starts to reduce. This is one of the 
arguments used in favour of a more individualised system of benefits (Millar, 2005). 
  
 
 
Aims: supporting work, reducing poverty and modernising systems 
 
Tax credits are a key element in the government’s reform programme aimed at 
increasing employment participation rates and reducing poverty. The key aims were 
set out by HM Treasury (2002, p. 3) as follows: 
 
– supporting families with children, recognising the responsibilities that come 
with parenthood; 
– tackling child poverty, by offering the greatest help to those most in need, 
such as low-income families; 
– helping to make sure that work pays more than welfare and that people have 
incentives to move up the earnings ladder. 
 
In addition, the tax credits were presented by the Treasury as an opportunity to 
‘modernise’ delivery, and in particular to create a simpler and more effective form of 
means-testing, with administration rationalised into one government department, the 
Inland Revenue (now HR Customs and Revenue), and assessment based on a simpler 
annual income test. The tax credits were designed to be simpler to administer and 
understand but also well targeted to people’s needs: “the income tax system provides 
a light touch and non-stigmatising way of measuring income’ (HM Treasury, 2002, 
para 2.10) which will 'provide continuity of support for those who are not 
experiencing significant changes in circumstances or income, with the ability to adjust 
quickly for those who are facing major changes' (op cit,  para 4.1) 
 
In order to seek to assess whether tax credits are meeting these aims, we start with an 
overview of the numbers in receipt since 2003.  
 
Receipt of tax credits  
Table 13.4 shows the numbers in receipt of tax credits since 2003. Overall the number 
of recipients has remained similar at about six million individuals or families. The six 
million includes about 1.4 million unemployed families (again the number has 
remained much the same over time) who are receiving the equivalent of Child Tax 
Credit while claiming an out-of-work benefit such as Income Support or Jobseekers 
Allowance. The number of working people receiving support has also remained 
steady at about 4.6 million. This represents about one in eight of the UK’s working-
age population.  
 
In 2003 there were about 121,000 working people without children receiving tax 
credits, rising to 376,000 by 2008. This is a sharp rise, but nevertheless these are a 
small minority and the bulk (over four million) of those in work receiving tax credits 
are families with children. These families can be divided into three main groups: those 
getting both Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit (about 1.7 million families), 
those getting Child Tax Credit only but receiving more than just the basic family 
element (about 671,000) and those receiving only the family element or less (about 
1.9 million).   
 
Table 13.4 Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit, provisional awards, 2003 
to 2008 
 Total Out 
of 
work 
In 
work 
In work 
(thousands) 
    No 
children- 
WTC 
only 
With 
children 
WTC and 
CTC 
With 
children 
CTC 
more than 
family 
element  
With 
children 
CTC 
family 
element 
or less 
2003 5.5m 1.4m 4.1m 121 1,465 647 1,851 
2004 6.0m 1.4m 4.5m 235 1,589 704 2,013 
2005 6.0m 1.4m 4.6m 282 1,531 711 2,115 
2006 6.0m 1.4m 4.6m 319 1,565 684 2,033 
2007 6.0m 1.4m 4.6m 343 1,645 665 1,966 
2008 6.0m 1.4m 4.6m 376 1,715 671 1,898 
April each year, except July 2003 
Source: HM Revenue and Customs (2008a) Table 1.1.  
 
Table 13.5 looks in more detail at the families with children, in order to compare 
couples and lone parents, using the most recent data for 2008.  There are a number of 
points to note here. Couples make up about 73 percent of working families in receipt 
of tax credits and lone parents about 27 percent. This is not dissimilar to the overall 
population proportion (lone parents make up about 25 per cent of all families with 
children)3. However lone parents and couples receive different types of support from 
tax credits. The majority (75 per cent) of couples are receiving Child Tax Credit only 
and just five per cent receive the maximum amount of Working Tax Credit. By 
contrast the majority (81 per cent) of lone parents are receiving both Child Tax Credit 
and Working Tax Credit. This of course reflects the lower earnings of lone parents – 
mainly lone mothers – and the fact that many of them work in part-time jobs. They 
                                                 
3 See also Brewer and Shaw (2006) for a discussion of the estimates of the numbers of lone parents 
receiving tax credits. 
are also sole earners (among couples about half of tax credit recipients are sole 
earners). In addition, almost half a million families are receiving help with childcare 
costs (a substantial increase since 2002, see table 13.2. above), but lone parents are 
more likely to receive this support than are couples (about 25 per cent compared with 
about five per cent).  
 
Table 13.5 Tax credits: in-work families with children, provisional awards, 2008 
 Total Couples Lone parents 
Tax credits % % % 
CTC and WTC: maximum    12 5 29 
CTC and WTC: tapered  28 20 52 
CTC only: more than family element 16 18 9 
CTC only: family element  41 53 9 
CTC only: less than family element 3 4 0.1 
 (100%) (100%) (100%) 
    
Number of families (000s) 4,284.4 3,146.6  1,137.8  
Number of children (000s) 7,435.1 5,693.2  1,741.9 
Child care element (000s) 448.8 161.7 287.1 
Source: HM Revenue and Customs (2008a), tables 2.1, 3.2, 4.3, 4.4, 5.1 and 5.2 
 
Poverty and work incentives 
Tax credits are an increasing significant part of government expenditure. In 2006/7 
about £20 billion was paid to tax credit recipients, including about £5.7 billion to 
families not in work and receiving tax credits for children and about £14.7 billion to 
working people (HM Revenue and Customs, 2008d). The average payment for family 
with two children receiving just the family element of Child Tax Credit was about 
£600 per year, rising to over £7000 for those receiving both Child Tax Credit and 
Working Tax Credit (HM Revenue and Customs, 2008a). Tax credits have increased 
the financial returns from work, especially for lone parents. In 1999 a one-child 
family with one adult working part time would have had an income in work of about 
£136 per week, by 2008 this had risen to £226 per week (TUC, 2008). 
 
Overall employment rates have been rising and poverty rates falling in recent years 
(see various Chapters here including 4, 8, 9 and 10). However estimating the direct 
impact of tax credits on employment rates and poverty is complex because of the 
range of other factors and policies involved. Brewer and Browne (2006) summarise 
evidence from five studies looking at Working Families Tax Credit (i.e. before the 
2003 changes) and conclude that Working Families Tax Credit increased the 
proportion of lone mothers who work (probably by about five percentage points) but 
had little overall effect on couples with children. HM Treasury (2008) concludes that 
Working Tax Credit has increased employment among childless people.  
 
The child poverty rate for children in working families is much lower than that of 
non-working families and much of the fall in child poverty rates since 2001 has been 
attributed to the impact of tax credits. Hirsch (2006, p42) concludes that initially 
‘rising employment was the biggest factor behind falls in child poverty, more recently 
it appears that jobs played a smaller role, and rises in tax credits a relatively large 
one’. However he also concludes that the current levels of tax credits will not be 
sufficient to meet the government’s targets for eliminating child poverty, although 
increasing spending on Child Tax Credit by £4.2 billion would meet the 2010 target 
of reducing child poverty by half.  Furthermore receipt of tax credits does not 
guarantee avoiding poverty. Barnes et al (2008), analysing data from the 2005 
Families with Children Survey, show that among those receiving tax credits, about 29 
per cent of couples with one earner are in poverty (defined as income below 60 per 
cent of the median), as are eight per cent of two-earner couples and 13 per cent of 
lone parents. To avoid poverty one earner couples at the minimum wage and receiving 
tax credits would have to work considerably more hours per week than lone parents 
(House Of Commons Work and Pensions Select Committee, 2008). Tax credits are 
more effective for lone parents than for one-earner couples because the poverty line is 
lower for lone parents but the level of tax credit is the same.  
 
Tax credits have thus contributed to rising employment and falling poverty. But at the 
same time there has been significant criticism of both the design and delivery of tax 
credits and some concern that failures in administration have undermined the capacity 
to meet policy objectives. 
 
Modernising design and delivery  
As Millar (2008, p26) points out there are several features of the administration that 
are new to the UK, including: 
 
• The use of the tax system to assess and make payments. 
• An income test based on an annual assessment of entitlement. 
• A simple definition of gross income, not taking into account capital assets. 
• Limited responsiveness to changes in income and other circumstances during 
the period of the award. 
• The separate tax credits for children and adults. 
• An integrated system of support for all children, regardless of the employment 
status of their parents (not yet fully achieved in practice). 
• The inclusion of childless and single people. 
 
Delivering such a system had proved very challenging for the government, and 
especially for HM Customs and Revenue, the department in charge of assessment and 
payment. As noted above, one of the aims for tax credits was to achieve a light-touch 
means-test that would balance security of support with responsiveness to changes in 
income and circumstances. This was to be achieved by not seeking to fine tune the 
credits to reflect changes as they happen (as is the case for Income Support, for 
example).  The assessment for tax credits is initially made on the basis of gross family 
income in the previous tax year. This forms the basis for the provisional award for the 
following 12 months. During the period of that award recipients are required to report 
certain changes in circumstances (such as splitting up with a partner) and awards are 
re-calculated during the year. However it is not required that all changes have to be 
reported and so there may be a difference between the provisional award (based on 
income in the previous tax year) and the finalised award (based on income in the 
current tax year). This is dealt with by means of an end of year reconciliation. At that 
point any underpayments are covered by a lump-sum payment at the end of the year 
and any overpayments are recovered either by adjusting subsequent tax credit awards 
or by adjusting the main tax codes if tax credits are no longer due. 
 
Under and overpayments are thus an inherent element of the design of tax credits. But 
the government were clearly taken by surprise by the extent of these. Over the first 
few years overpayments affected about 1.9 million awards per year, costing about 
£1.5 billion to 1.8 billion annually. Underpayments affected about 0.8 million awards, 
at about £0.5 billion annually (Millar, 2008). Families receiving both Child Tax 
Credit and Working Tax Credit were the most likely to have under or overpayments, 
and these are the lowest income families, most likely to have volatile income and 
circumstances and most likely to rely upon tax credits for a substantial part of their 
incomes. The repayment of overpayments has been a source of significant concern 
and hardship for families, as has the lack of transparency and poor communication. 
Qualitative research with lone-parent families receiving tax credits has shown how 
important these are to family income in work but has also highlighted the problems 
caused by delays, incorrect payments, changes to awards and by a general lack of 
information and clarity about awards (Millar, 2008; Ridge and Millar, 2008).  Box 
13.2 summarises some of the key points of criticism of the administration of tax 
credits. 
 
Box 13.2   The administration of tax credits – issues and problems 
Godwin and Lawson (2008) identify the following issues in the delivery of tax 
credits:  
 
• Under and overpayments -  the scale of these, the impact on families, and the 
difficulties in recovering overpayments, leading to the write-off of significant 
debts 
 
• Fraud and Error – estimated at about £1.04 to £1.30 billion in 2004/5, fraud has 
included organised fraud on the online claiming system, and there are high levels 
of customer error due to lack of understanding of the system. 
 
• Take-up – The latest figures for 2005/6 (HMRC, 2008b) show 82 per cent take up 
of Child Tax Credit and 61 per cent take up of Working Tax Credit. About 1.1 
million people estimated to be eligible non-claimants of Working Tax Credit, with 
about £2.2 billion unclaimed.  
 • Compliance costs to employers – this was higher under Working Families Tax 
Credit which was paid through the pay packet, which is not the case for Child and 
Working Tax Credits. Godwin and Lawson suggest that the main cost to 
employers is in providing information to assist people with claims. 
   
• Compliance costs to claimants – the lengthy claim form, the obligations to report 
some changes, problems with estimating income and childcare costs, difficulties 
in accessing helpline services, delays and errors.  
 
Various reports have criticised the administration of tax credits including: National 
Audit Office, 2005; Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, 2005; House of 
Commons Treasury Committee, 2006; House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts, 2007. 
 
A series of reforms to the system brought in from 2005 onwards were intended to 
improve the administration of tax credits and specifically to reduce over and under 
payments (Brewer, 2006). The measures included a very large increase in the level of 
disregarded earnings from £2,500 to £25,000. This means that if income rises by up to 
£25,000 in one year, the tax credit award for that year will not be adjusted. This 
provides a significant cushion against overpayments occurring due to income rises. 
Other measures included changes to the reporting requirements and to the way awards 
are adjusted in the year.  These changes have lead to a fall in overpayments of about 
£0.7 billion, such that in 2006/7 overpayments stand at about £1.0 billion, affecting 
about one million awards. Underpayments are still at about £0.5 billion, affecting 
about 0.8 million people (HM Revenue and Customs, 2008c). 
 
Various wider reforms have been suggested (Brewer, 2006; House of Commons 
Treasury Committee, 2006; Smithies, 2007) including a return to a fixed period of 
award, with no requirement to respond to changes in income or circumstances during 
that time (as in the old family income supplement and family credit systems). HM 
Treasury (2008) argues against this on the grounds of the need for flexibility and 
effective targeting, and instead proposes further reforms to the administration, 
including more disregards, lump-sum payments, use of banded income measures, and 
changes to the delivery of childcare support.   
 
Tax credits and welfare reform 
 
Tax credits are central to the Labour government’s welfare reform agenda. Adler 
(2004) argues that tax credits and the New Deal programmes together represent a 
‘new and distinctive’ approach to social security policy, addressing the new social 
risks of insecurity in employment and family structure. Tax credits provide income 
support to people in potentially adverse labour market situations, including low pay, 
self-employment, part-time work, and temporary or irregular work. They are also 
intended to enable families with just one earner, especially lone-parent families, to 
sustain employment. Tax credits can therefore be seen as part of a shift towards a 
“social investment” welfare state, which promotes self-support through employment, 
and includes policies intended to improve skills for employment, to invest in children, 
and to enable people to build up assets (Dobrowolsky and Jenson, 2005). Grover and 
Stewart (2002) interpret these policy developments in a different way, arguing that tax 
credits and other measures to ‘make work pay’ are about ensuring that unemployed 
people are driven into low-paid jobs while the costs of labour to employers are kept 
low.   
 
The importance of tax credits shows how the UK ‘social security’ has become 
increasingly focused on wage supplementation rather than on wage replacement, 
which was the rationale for the system of social insurance designed by Beveridge in 
the 1940s.  Tax credits are also a break with Beveridge in another sense, in that they 
take the UK even further down the means-testing road and away from universal or 
categorical ways of targeting support. Compared with any previous measures, tax 
credits cover more groups of the population and extend higher up the income scale. 
The attempt to do this by means of a ‘light touch and non-stigmatising’ means test has 
proved to be very difficult to achieve in practice and arguably the changes since 2003 
have pushed the system further back into the more traditional form of means-tested 
support. Balancing simplicity and responsiveness, while still targeting effectively, is 
an elusive goal.  
 
Overview 
 
Support for low-paid workers dates back over 30 years in the UK, but has become 
increasingly important in recent years. 
 
Tax credits are now a key part of the UK income transfer system, providing financial 
support to six million people, including 4.6 million working families with children. 
 
They are innovative in design, extensive in coverage and generous in level compared 
with the UK’s traditional means-tested social security support. There has been 
significant criticism of the design and delivery of tax credits, in particular the extent 
of over and under payments and how these have been dealt with.  
 
Tax credits have contributed to rising employment and falling poverty, providing a 
substantial boost to the incomes of many low-paid people. They are central to the 
government’s welfare reform agenda.  
 
 
Questions for discussion 
1. Why have tax credits become such an important part of government policy? 
2. Have the government found the right balance between simplicity, targeting 
and responsiveness in the design of the Child Tax and Working Tax Credits? 
3. How could the administration of tax credits be improved? 
 
 
Website Resources 
HM Treasury Work and 
Welfare  
http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/documents/taxation_work_and_welfare
/work_and_welfare/tax_workwel_index.cfm
 
HM Revenue and Customs – 
Tax Credit statistics 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-
credits/cwtc-quarterly-stats.htm
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